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The Takeaway © Mosbacher Institute 
Unlike most other countries where the government owns 
the rights to all minerals, the United States has fragment-
ed mineral ownership, where the rights to extract oil and 
gas can be owned by the federal government, state gov-
ernments, and private owners. Different owners put differ-
ent requirements and regulations on oil and gas firms, and 
these in turn affect the profitability and therefore the like-
lihood of drilling. These regulations can also lead to spa-
tial spillover effects, where regulations on one plot of land 
can affect the profitability of drilling on nearby land. This 
report explores a setting in Wyoming to show how regula-
tions on state-owned land affect the likelihood of drilling 
on nearby federal-owned land.1 
In the US, land and mineral rights are owned by the federal 
government, state governments, and private owners. As a re-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The US has a patchwork of land 
ownership and regulation. 
 
Regulations that make drilling 
cheaper on state land also result 
in reduced drilling on nearby 
federal land. 
 
Federal land that is close to state 
land also has lower probability of 
drilling than federal land that is 
far from state land. 
 
Local policies designed to 
increase (or decrease) drilling 
may have the opposite effect on 
land nearby. 
2 
sult, the U.S. has a complicated patchwork of 
mineral ownership, with federally owned 
land, state-owned land, and privately-owned 
plots in close proximity—each under their 
own rules and regulations. Therefore, an 
important policy question is how plot-
specific regulations affect both drilling on a 
given plot as well as how they affect drilling 
on nearby plots. 
One reason why policies on one plot of land 
can affect the probability of drilling on near-
by plots is because of how firms search for 
oil and gas. If a firm is interested in search-
ing for oil and gas in a given region, it will 
first drill an exploratory well on one plot of 
land. Only if the exploratory well is suffi-
ciently productive will the firm drill addi-
tional wells. All else being equal, the firm 
will typically drill the exploratory well on 
the plot with the lowest regulatory costs to 
the firm. As a result, the firm may end up 
having a lower probability of drilling on 
nearby plots with higher regulatory costs 
because those other plots are only drilled if 
the initial exploratory well is sufficiently 
productive.   
At least anecdotally, state and private land is 
typically perceived as being easier for firms 
to drill on than federal land. This is due to a 
number of factors, including stricter envi-
ronmental protection requirements as well 
as greater delays in processing applications 
for drilling on federal land. In addition, fed-
eral land often has higher rental rates as 
well as higher reserve rates in auctions than 
state lands. One dimension in which federal 
rules can be more favorable to firms is in 
royalties. For example, in Wyoming the roy-
alties for drilling on state land are higher 
than that of federal land. 
One challenge in evaluating the effects of 
federal versus state and private policies is 
that the land that has remained in federal 
ownership tends to be more remote, rugged, 
and arid, which tends to make drilling more 
costly. Therefore, without some kind of nat-
ural experiment that holds land quality fixed 
while varying ownership, it is not possible to 
conclude that differences in drilling rates 
are due to regulations and spillover effects, 
or because of some other factors.   
THE 16/36 NATURAL EXPERIMENT  
The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided a nat-
ural experiment that helps to understand 
the effects of land regulations. This law man-
dated that certain regularly spaced plots of 
land be transferred to state ownership upon 
statehood. In Wyoming, this led to a pattern 
of state ownership where every 16th and 
36th square mile section of land was trans-
ferred to state ownership, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.   
Because the rule for assigning land to state 
ownership does not depend on the remote-
ness, ruggedness, or aridity of the land, this 
natural experiment provides a useful setting 













































































Figure 1: Assignment to State Ownership Rule 
affect drilling. In particular, by examining 
drilling probabilities on the 16th and 36th 
sections with other sections, we can exam-
ine the overall effects of state policies with 
federal policies. In addition, by comparing 
land in federal ownership that is close to 
state land with land in federal ownership 
that is far from state land, we can explore 
how policies on state land lead to spillover 
effects on federal land. 
In Wyoming, this land ownership pattern 
has remained particularly persistent. Figure 
2 shows a snapshot of current ownership 
from one part of Wyoming, with federal land 
in light pink, private land in dark pink, and 
state land in green. Therefore, Wyoming is a 
particularly good place to examine how 
these land ownership patterns affect oil and 
gas drilling.  
DRILLING PATTERNS OVER SPACE  
Examining drilling data shows that whether 
land was a 16/36 section or close to a 16/36 
section has a significant effect on drilling. 
Figure 3 graphs the probability of explorato-
ry drilling. There we find that the probabil-
ity of exploratory drilling is highest on those 
16/36 sections. We also find that the second 
highest probability of drilling is on those 
sections of land that are furthest away from 
the 16/36 sections.  
Figure 4 graphs the probability of any drill-
ing. There we find that the probability of any 
drilling is again highest for those 16/36 sec-
tions, and is next highest for those parcels of 
land that are the furthest away from the 
16/36 sections. Figure 4 also shows that 
overall, drilling is highest on state land (the 
16/36 sections), consistent with anecdotes 
that federal land has higher regulatory costs 














































































Source: Multiple sources and author’s calculations2 
Figure 3: Exploratory Drilling 
Figure 4: Any Drilling  
Source: Multiple sources and author’s calculations2 
Figure 2: Current Land Patterns   
Source: Bureau of Land Management 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY?  
The exploratory and overall drilling graphs in 
Figures 3 and 4 show that land ownership 
has a significant effect on drilling patterns. In 
particular, the drilling patterns show that 
state land seems to be preferred for drilling. 
In addition, the drilling data show that state 
ownership seems to discourage drilling on 
nearby federal land, as federal land that is 
furthest from state land has the highest prob-
ability of drilling of all federal land.  
These findings are consistent with how oil 
and gas firms search for oil and gas. If a firm 
is interested in searching for oil and gas in an 
area that includes both state and federally 
owned parcels, then it will likely begin ex-
ploratory drilling on state land, and then only 
proceed to drill on federal land if it finds oil 
on the state land. In contrast, if it is searching 
for oil and gas in an area far from state land, 
its only options are to drill on federal land. 
Therefore, federal land that is close to state 
land will tend to have lower probability of 
exploratory and overall drilling than federal 
land that is far from state land. 
These findings also suggest the need for cau-
tion when evaluating federal and state oil 
regulations. Local policies designed to in-
crease drilling by decreasing the costs of 
drilling may also have the effect of reducing 
drilling on nearby land. Similarly, local poli-
cies that increase the costs of drilling may 
also have the impact of increasing drilling on 
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Notes: 
1 This takeaway is based on: Lewis, E. (2019). Patchwork 
Policies, Spillovers, and the Search for Oil and Gas. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 11(1), 380-
405. doi: 10.1257/pol.20160373 
2 The data for the figures can be found in the appendix of 
the author’s paper at https://assets.aeaweb.org/asset-
server/files/8911.pdf.  
